Here’s an interesting bit, courtesy of one of those wacky left leaning sites:
“Recommendation #74 reads:
In the short term, if not enough civilians volunteer to fill key positions in Iraq, civilian agencies must fill those positions with directed assignments. Steps should be taken to mitigate familial or financial hardships posed by directed assignments, including tax exclusions similar to those authorized for U.S. military personnel serving in Iraq.”
That’s right, you in the local VA office – pack your bags, you’re going to Iraq!
And here’s an AP report on troop reactions to it. It’s a sad read.
What’s your opinion Vivian? I think, on the surface, it seems like a good waste of 8 months, since it really tells us NOTHING we didn’t already know. That being said, I haven’t actually read the entire thing (yet)….
I haven’t read the full report, but the Washington Post has a 9 page executive summary which is well worth reading . . .
On balance the report gives me reason for optimism. A few highlights:
“During the past nine months we have considered a full range of approaches . . . All have flaws. Our recommended course has shortcomings, but we firmly believe that it includes the best strategies and tactics to positively influence the outcome of the region”.
This is how realists speak. No false dichotomies (e.g. we win, they lose if we don’t pursue “victory”).
“We believe it is still possible to pursue different policies that can give Iraq an opportunity for a better future, combat terrorism, stablize a critical region of the world, and protect American credibility, interest, and values.”
For the first time in 3 years–here is a statement of concrete objectives. You can’t build a strategy around an ambigious, ill-defined notion of “victory” or some ambigious desire to have “a beacon of Democracy in the Middle East”. This is a good start.
Finally:
” . . . these recommendations offer a way forward . . . They are comprehensive and need to be implemented in a coordinated fashion. They should not be separated or carried out in isolation.”
For the first time someone makes a statement that acknowledges the importance of a truly comprehensive strategy. My biggest concern here is that POTUS and congress might exercise the skills of a lower-tier executive and feel obliged to put a “signature” on the policy (e.g. messing with individual elements without understanding the impact on the big picture).
A top-tier executive knows when to put his or her ego aside and only make corrections to a policy if it makes sense in light of the key objectives (e.g. give Iraq an opportunity for a better future, combat terrorism, stablize a critical region of the world, and protect American credibility, interest, and values). Hopefully our leaders exercise the skills of top-tier executives.
My only grounds for pessimism rests with our leadership, not with the suggestions of the study group. Hopefully, GWB and congress prove me wrong on this.
VIVIAN J. PAIGE | All Politics is Local 
Here’s an interesting bit, courtesy of one of those wacky left leaning sites:
“Recommendation #74 reads:
In the short term, if not enough civilians volunteer to fill key positions in Iraq, civilian agencies must fill those positions with directed assignments. Steps should be taken to mitigate familial or financial hardships posed by directed assignments, including tax exclusions similar to those authorized for U.S. military personnel serving in Iraq.”
That’s right, you in the local VA office – pack your bags, you’re going to Iraq!
And here’s an AP report on troop reactions to it. It’s a sad read.
What’s your opinion Vivian? I think, on the surface, it seems like a good waste of 8 months, since it really tells us NOTHING we didn’t already know. That being said, I haven’t actually read the entire thing (yet)….
I haven’t read the full report, but the Washington Post has a 9 page executive summary which is well worth reading . . .
Click to access ISG_execsummary_120606.pdf
On balance the report gives me reason for optimism. A few highlights:
“During the past nine months we have considered a full range of approaches . . . All have flaws. Our recommended course has shortcomings, but we firmly believe that it includes the best strategies and tactics to positively influence the outcome of the region”.
This is how realists speak. No false dichotomies (e.g. we win, they lose if we don’t pursue “victory”).
“We believe it is still possible to pursue different policies that can give Iraq an opportunity for a better future, combat terrorism, stablize a critical region of the world, and protect American credibility, interest, and values.”
For the first time in 3 years–here is a statement of concrete objectives. You can’t build a strategy around an ambigious, ill-defined notion of “victory” or some ambigious desire to have “a beacon of Democracy in the Middle East”. This is a good start.
Finally:
” . . . these recommendations offer a way forward . . . They are comprehensive and need to be implemented in a coordinated fashion. They should not be separated or carried out in isolation.”
For the first time someone makes a statement that acknowledges the importance of a truly comprehensive strategy. My biggest concern here is that POTUS and congress might exercise the skills of a lower-tier executive and feel obliged to put a “signature” on the policy (e.g. messing with individual elements without understanding the impact on the big picture).
A top-tier executive knows when to put his or her ego aside and only make corrections to a policy if it makes sense in light of the key objectives (e.g. give Iraq an opportunity for a better future, combat terrorism, stablize a critical region of the world, and protect American credibility, interest, and values). Hopefully our leaders exercise the skills of top-tier executives.
My only grounds for pessimism rests with our leadership, not with the suggestions of the study group. Hopefully, GWB and congress prove me wrong on this.